Chairperson’s Final Report Regarding a Complaint of Racial Profiling and Wrongful Detention (MPCC‑2021‑010)

OVERVIEW

1. Mr. F complains that he was wrongfully detained, handcuffed, and discriminated against by members of the military police (MP). The Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) has found that much of Mr. F’s complaint is supported by the evidence – most concerningly, Mr. F was subject to racial profiling.

2. This complaint stems from an incident on February 23, 2021. Mr. F was working on a Canadian Forces Base when his truck hit a security gate. Corporal (Cpl) S^{Footnote 1} was among the MP members who responded to the accident. When Mr. F’s name was run through Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), someone with the same name and a similar date of birth was found to have an immigration warrant. Without realizing that the date of birth on the warrant was different than Mr. F’s, confirming the warrant as per standard procedure, or asking Mr. F about the warrant, Cpl S handcuffed Mr. F and placed him in an interview room in the detachment, under the guard of another officer. When the error was noted, Mr. F was released. Mr. F and his colleague sought to understand the situation, speaking to both Cpl S and his commanding officer, Captain (Capt) P. Mr. F alleges that during this conversation, he was threatened with force and wrongfully denied proof of the warrant.

3. Mr. F complained to the MPCC, arguing that he was wrongfully arrested, detained, discriminated against, and threatened when he sought proof about why he was detained. The complaint was sent to the Office of Professional Standards (PS) of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) for first review. PS interviewed the two military police subjects, as well as three other military police members working that day. Information was sought from Mr. F’s two co-workers present, but PS did not interview Mr. F. Based on this evidence, PS determined that the allegations in the complaint were not substantiated.

4. In his request for review, Mr. F argues that he was harassed and discriminated against – he seeks an apology. He argues that the PS investigation was biased in interviewing only military police witnesses and that the conclusions are in error.

5. In our review, we identified six allegations:

6. To complete its review, the MPCC interviewed Mr. F and reviewed his complaint dated April 7, 2021, and his request for review dated November 6, 2023. We reviewed the entirety of the evidence on which PS based their decision. We also conducted our own interviews with Cpl S and Cpl B. Cpl P did not respond to the MPCC’s request to interview him. Witnesses Sgt C, Mr. B, and Mr. S also did not respond. The MPCC located and interviewed Ms. T, the civilian dispatcher who ran the CPIC check that led to Mr. F’s detention. She had not been interviewed by PS.

7. As we explain, we find that Mr. F was improperly detained and handcuffed without basic verification of the CPIC hit. This detention was, at least in part, influenced by racial discrimination, reflected in our finding of racial profiling. Military Police (MP) Orders did not properly guide members in respecting Mr. F’s liberty rights or his right to counsel. These actions were compounded by a failure to document key facts, a lack of preserved video evidence, and weak supervisory oversight. Though Mr. F was properly denied seeing the warrant, which was not for him, we also found that Cpl S and Cpl P treated Mr. F in a discourteous manner.

8. These are serious findings that speak to foundational concerns about liberty, dignity, and bias in policing. The MPCC made recommendations aimed at addressing both individual conduct and broader systemic and procedural deficiencies. In particular, we recommended specific steps to give military police members the training and policy support necessary to identify, understand, and address the risk of racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory treatment.

9. The National Defence Act (NDA) specifically requires the CFPM to “notify the Minister and the Chairperson of any action that has been or will be taken with respect to the complaint” or, if no action is to be taken, the CFPM must provide “the reasons for not so acting.”^{Footnote 2}

10. On October 27, 2025, the CFPM provided their Notice of Action in response to the MPCC’s Interim Report issued on July 29, 2025. Of the twenty recommendations, we consider five to have been accepted in their entirety, seven partially accepted, and eight not accepted.

11. This report underscores that accountability in military policing requires more than addressing individual misconduct: it demands systemic safeguards against racial profiling through clear policies, training, effective supervision, and transparent corrective action. Unlike major Canadian police services that have adopted biasfree frameworks, the military police lack comparable instruments. The CFPM’s Notice of Action provided vague or insufficient responses to most of the MPCC’s recommendations. Although many of the CFPM’s comments expressed a general intent to align military police policies and procedures with Canadian best policing practices, such alignment is already an expected standard. As a matter of course, the CFPM is responsible for keeping policies current with established policing best practices. A general commitment to do so does not, on its own, demonstrate what specific actions or measures, if any, will be taken in response to the MPCC’s recommendations.

12. As the senior MP authority, the CFPM plays a central leadership role in ensuring that lessons identified through oversight translate into concrete institutional improvements. Effective leadership requires clear articulation of corrective steps, timely action, and transparent communication. As this report emphasizes, true accountability requires clear and concrete explanations of how errors will be corrected, risks mitigated, and reforms implemented to ensure professionalism, fairness, and continuous improvement in military policing.

13. The MPCC urges the CFPM to fully implement the recommendations in this report to reinforce the professionalism, fairness, and rigour expected of the military police and that members of the Canadian Forces deserve.

Analysis

Standard of review applicable to the alleged conduct

14. Military police members, in the performance of their duties, are expected to meet high standards of service to maintain public confidence and respect. The Military Police Professional Code of Conduct^{Footnote 3} (MPPCC) Standing Orders, and MP Policy Advisories set out the procedures and ethical standards that military police members are expected to follow or apply.

15. When reviewing a conduct complaint, the MPCC must determine whether the conduct alleged against military police members can be compared to that of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances. The law does not require perfect or optimal conduct on the part of military police members.^{Footnote 4}

16. The reasonableness of the military police member's conduct must be assessed considering the totality of the situation and the facts known at the time of the alleged misconduct, including the state of knowledge or best investigative or law enforcement practices that applied at the time.^{Footnote 5}

17. Our role is to review the evidence and determine if the conduct of the subjects was reasonable. To do this, we must first apply a standard of proof based on a balance of probabilities to determine the facts. In other words, we must determine what happened. Then we must assess whether the military police members’ actions were reasonable.

Cpl S improperly detained Mr. F

18. The Complainant argues that Cpl S improperly arrested or detained him. PS formulated this allegation as follows:

Allegation #1: Cpl [S] showed up and aggressively demanded Mr. [F]’s identification and “came back in no time and said there is arrest warent [sic] against you from immigration department and you are under arrest for investigation”. Cpl [S] then “cuffed me in front of my team and took me inside.”

19. PS concluded that, although Cpl S made an error in reading the details of the immigration warrant, he was not aggressive or discourteous to Mr. F, and he acted in good faith when he detained him. For these reasons, PS found that this allegation was not substantiated. In his request for review, Mr. F argues that it is incomprehensible that a military police member would make an error in comparing identification to a police database in this manner.

20. For the following reasons, we find that Cpl S was not justified in detaining Mr. F. We have separated the issue of the detention and the issue of the manner of the detention (i.e., handcuffing) into two separate allegations.

21. We note, though, that these two allegations are linked, and we cannot lose sight of the totality of the circumstances. Although the detention lasted approximately eleven minutes, Mr. F was subjected to a highly intrusive form of detention – handcuffed, searched, escorted into the detachment, and placed in an interview room under guard – based on an error. No efforts were made to verify, question, or confirm facts before Cpl S went to the furthest limits of police power to intrude on Mr. F’s liberty.

22. Military police procedures require that CPIC query results be interpreted carefully and that all key identifiers, such as name and date of birth, be verified before action is taken. In this case, Cpl S did not confirm the date of birth before acting, which contravened those professional obligations. The use of handcuffs, search, and escorted confinement represented the most restrictive form of investigative detention. Given that Cpl S had not verified the CPIC return and had access to immediate confirming information (e.g., date of birth), these actions were disproportionate to the circumstances and constituted an excessive use of state authority. These allegations are therefore supported by the evidence.

23. Good faith is not the standard to which investigative detention is held. While Cpl S may have acted without malice, the Supreme Court has confirmed that “good faith” is not a legal defence to an unreasonable detention^{Footnote 6}. What is required is not subjective intent, but an objectively reasonable basis for the detention at the time it was carried out.

The applicable law and policy

24. Investigative detention requires an officer to have reasonable suspicion that a person is associated with or involved in criminal activity under investigation. The Supreme Court has confirmed that since reasonable suspicion requires only the possibility, rather than the probability of criminal activity, “it provides police officers with justification to engage in otherwise impermissible, intrusive conduct such as searches and detentions.”^{Footnote 7} This means it is “subject to ‘rigorous,’ ‘independent,’ and ‘exacting’ judicial scrutiny.”^{Footnote 8}

25. Canadian Forces Military Police Group (CF MP Gp) Order 2-355 states that “the decision by an MP to place a person into investigative detention must not be taken lightly” and it must be reasonable given the circumstances.^{Footnote 9}

26. To determine whether reasonable suspicion justified an investigative detention, we must consider the totality of the facts and the proportionality of the police actions to them:

The determination will focus on the nature of the situation, including the seriousness of the offence, as well as on the information known to the police about the suspect or the crime, and the extent to which the detention was reasonably responsive or tailored to these circumstances, including its geographic and temporal scope. This means balancing the seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety with the liberty interests of members of the public to determine whether, given the extent of the risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive of liberty interests than is reasonably necessary to address the risk.^{Footnote 10}

27. In terms of CPIC hits, CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex E sets out the procedures to follow for CPIC hit confirmations. Particularly, “when an MP query results in a hit, CPIC information must not be acted upon without verification with the originating agency.”^{Footnote 11} Annex E also states that “the Supreme Court of Canada has deemed that detention in excess of 20 minutes while awaiting a CPIC hit confirmation does not constitute a violation of a person’s [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] (Charter) rights.”^{Footnote 12}

28. We find that Cpl S did not have reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Mr. F. The manner of the detention was also not proportionate or tailored to the circumstances, as we will discuss under Allegation #2.

Cpl S did not have reasonable suspicion

29. For the following reasons, we conclude that Cpl S did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. F. The detention did not have regard to the totality of the circumstances: it was done without due diligence, without regard to the known facts, and elements of Cpl S’s justifications for it were not credible.

30. There is no dispute that Mr. F was exiting the secure area of the base when the security gate closed on his truck as he was driving through. Mr. F and his co-workers, one of whom was driving a second vehicle, pulled into the military police parking lot and began to review the damage to the truck. Cpl B’s notes indicate that they also sought to repair a broken taillight.

31. There is some confusion about who first approached Mr. F about the accident, either Cpl B or Cpl S. Mr. F’s evidence was inconsistent on this point. Cpl B and Cpl S’s notes and interviews suggest that Cpl B first approached and was joined by Cpl S some time later.

32. No one disputes, however, that Mr. F was asked for his licence and registration papers. His licence was run on CPIC. This search returned a hit with an immigration warrant for someone with the same name as Mr. F and what appeared at first glance to Cpl S to be his date of birth.

Cpl S did not demonstrate due diligence

33. Mr. F was detained by mistake, on the strength of an immigration warrant for someone else. There were various indicators that the warrant was not for Mr. F and these were not properly considered before he was detained.

34. During his interview with PS, Cpl S stated that the dispatcher on duty, Ms. T, ran the CPIC query. Cpl S went back to his desk, as Cpl B was going to take care of the motor vehicle collision. Someone came to tell him that the CPIC hit had revealed an immigration warrant. Cpl S then went to the dispatch office and looked at the warrant on a screen and compared the driver’s licence to it. He stated this was a “quick brush over.” He did not notice that while the day and year of the date of birth on the immigration warrant matched Mr. F’s, the month did not. He stated that he noted that there was a caution V or “Victor” for violence, he proceeded directly outside to detain and handcuff Mr. F, bringing him into an interview room and leaving him uncuffed but under watch by Cpl B.

35. Cpl B confirmed these facts. He stated that he was told by dispatch about the warrant, and he went to get Cpl S. He said that he and Cpl S reviewed the CPIC information for only 20-30 seconds before deciding to place Mr. F under detention. The CPIC query was run at 13:23 – according to officer notes, Mr. F was detained only two minutes later at 13:25.

36. Reasonable suspicion is focused on possibilities, not probabilities. Of course, this leaves room for honest mistakes. The “reality of police work often entails making quick decisions in emergency situations and under pressure.”^{Footnote 13} Decisions by police must be “judged by what was or should reasonably have been known to them at the time, not in light of how things turned out to be.”^{Footnote 14}

37. In terms of what should reasonably have been known to Cpl S, Mr. F’s date of birth did not match the date of birth on the immigration warrant.

38. What is more, CPIC hits are scored. As the PS investigator was informed by the Military Police National Records Centre, the score “is based on a complex automated computation of inputs that is designed to assign a value of how likely [it is] that a return is a ‘match.’ The ‘system’ can still give a score of ‘0,’ however the final determination is up to the ‘user’ if there is a match or not.” The information entered about Mr. F gave a possible maximum score of 22. “[T]he CPIC return containing the portion of a possible ‘Immigration Warrant’ presented a score of ‘0’.”

39. Cpl B did not recall looking at the index score. Cpl S, in his interview with PS, stated that he does not typically use the index score as a reference point. In his MPCC interview, Cpl S said he does typically look at the index score, but he did not remember if he did so in this case. He also seemed to misunderstand that a low score meant a better match than a high score, when in fact, the opposite is true. Cpl S told the MPCC that he was not informed of the index score in this case.

40. This information was all readily available upon a review of the CPIC information, and part of the due diligence expected of military police members. CF MP Gp Orders are clear that CPIC results ought to be verified before they are acted upon.

41. Rather than further consideration or the required verification, Cpl S told the MPCC that, based on procedures, Mr. F was secured in handcuffs, and the next step was to detain and then confirm the warrant. Cpl S stated that he was not aware of any standard operating procedures regarding the validation of a CPIC hit before detaining someone. For him, “a warrant is a warrant,” and that gives him the right to arrest or detain.

42. The date of birth on the warrant and the low index score were reasonably and readily available to Cpl S. This type of due diligence is required prior to a decision to deprive someone of their liberty.

Cpl S did not have regard to the totality of the facts known to him

43. Cpl S also did not have regard to the totality of the circumstances in deciding to detain Mr. F first and conduct verification later.

44. In his PS interview, Cpl S stated that upon being detained, Mr. F was compliant but confused. He had recent security clearances to work on the base and wondered how, therefore, there could be an immigration warrant against him. Cpl S stated that this is what got him “wondering what was going on.”

45. The same facts that gave Cpl S pause after he detained Mr. F, however, were known to him before the detention and ought to have given him pause before detaining at all. Mr. F was exiting a secured area of the base. Cpl B indicated in his MPCC interview that all vehicles going into the base are searched, and drivers require a pass to enter the area.

46. After the collision with the gate, Mr. F willingly pulled into the military police parking lot. When approached by officers, he willingly provided his driver’s licence and other information. Though closed-circuit television system (CCTV) footage of the parking lot had been deleted by the time of the PS investigation, the parking lot was covered by CCTV.

47. Therefore, there was no haste required to detain Mr. F. Cpl B agreed, during his MPCC interview, that Mr. F had no reason to flee while the CPIC search was being run. Military police had his driver’s licence – if he had fled, military police could have located him. As Cpl P stated in his PS interview, Cpl S may simply have been “excited to finally get something out of [this base]” – this led to a hasty detention without regard to the facts.

48. A reasonable police officer would not find that detention was necessary prior to conducting a review of the warrant and properly verifying it, given that the suspect was on military police property, having attended there of his own accord and being known to work on the base. While investigative detention is, in some circumstances, permitted while conducting verifications, it must still be reasonably necessary given the totality of the circumstances. In this case, it was not.

Elements of Cpl S’s justifications for the detention were not credible

49. Cpl S and Cpl B both offered retroactive justifications for their actions which cast some doubt on their credibility.

50. Both military police members stated that the initial interaction, after the collision with the gate, was motivated by a suspicion that Mr. F was not going to report the accident. Cpl S told PS that he remembered being suspicious that Mr. F had not yet reported the accident. He stated that “they were not reporting we had to go make contact with them,” and they were “trying to tape together parts of the truck as if they […] didn’t know they were on video camera.” Cpl B told PS that he was annoyed, because there was no reason they could not report it – there had been “plenty of time” and they parked in “our” parking lot and then began to make repairs instead of reporting immediately. During his MPCC interview, Cpl B stated that Mr. F and his co-workers were in the parking lot for almost half an hour without reporting.

51. Cpl S’s notes indicate that at 13:11 dispatch advised a truck had “just” hit the gate. Call times show that military police members were on scene at 13:17 – similarly, the Aerospace Control log notes that the time of the collision was 13:11 and that military police members were on scene checking for damage at 13:17. It appears that 6 minutes passed between the collision and military police contact with Mr. F. ^{Footnote 15}

52. The MPCC interviewed Ms. T, the dispatcher who was on duty at the time of the accident and who ran the CPIC query. We found her testimony to be careful, clear in what she could and could not remember, and overall credible. Her memory is that perhaps only 5 minutes passed between the time of the accident and the time MP members made contact with Mr. F. She stated that anyone on the base had to check in with the detachment first. She believed she heard comments at the time of the collision that it involved the contractors working on the base before military police made contact with Mr. F. Ms. T told the MPCC that she felt that the military police members were annoyed at the time of the accident, perhaps because it was careless and could have been avoided.

53. The suspicion, therefore, that Mr. F would not report the accident is not credible, particularly as he had pulled the vehicle into the military police parking lot immediately following the collision. Only minutes passed between the time of the collision and the time MP members made contact with Mr. F, who stated he wanted to review the damage before reporting. Mr. B, Mr. F’s co-worker who was interviewed by PS, stated that they told military police that they would report the accident but wished first to inform their employer and take instructions because this was an unexpected incident.

54. In Ontario, under s. 199 of Highway Traffic Act^{Footnote 16} and s. 11 of Regulation 596^{Footnote 17}, any person involved in an accident must report it immediately to the nearest police officer if it results in personal injuries or property damage exceeding $2,000. We find that military police were justified in approaching Mr. F after the accident. There was not, however, a reasonable suspicion that he intended not to report.

55. Cpl S also suggested that he was asked to or altered his notes after the fact. His notes indicate that the CPIC return had a caution V, for violence, and that the “warrant also states that subject possible to not appear – will secure in handcuffs with this and V.” The report Cpl S completed of the incident indicates that Mr. F was “secured in handcuffs to the rear based on the caution classification of violence and possible flight risk/escape custody.”

56. In his interview with the MPCC, however, Cpl S stated that he noticed the flight risk caution after the detention, when he was writing the report. He first guessed that perhaps he had been asked to write that, or it was added when the report was vetted, but later stated that things were coming back to him and that he would have noted this after the detention while writing the report. On a balance of probabilities, Cpl S appeared to imply that he added additional justifications for his actions after the fact. This reduces the credibility of his evidence regarding the interactions he had with Mr. F.

57. PS concluded that Cpl S was acting in good faith, and in the lawful performance of his duties. However, for the above reasons, we find that Cpl S did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. F. This is not a situation governed by s. 25(2) of the Criminal Code,^{Footnote 18} where good faith can justify a defective process, as highlighted in the PS investigative references. Courts have held that reliance on erroneous information will not be objectively reasonable if “the police could reasonably have made inquiries which would have led to the discovery of the deficiencies or defects.”^{Footnote 19} For example:

[89] [i]n Kossick, the arresting officer relied on information from another officer indicating there was an arrest warrant in place. The arresting officer proceeded with the arrest in non-urgent circumstances and without personally checking the electronic databases, including CPIC, which he had open in front of him and that would have revealed the arrest warrant had already been executed. In Kossick, the finding that the police could reasonably have made inquiries was not triggered by any reason to doubt that an arrest warrant was in place, but by the ease with which the status of the warrant could have been checked before depriving Mr. Kossick of his liberty.^{Footnote 20}

58. Though the above relates to arrest and not investigative detention, the principles are helpful. An honest mistake does not excuse the lack of due diligence that would have discovered and assessed the above circumstances. An investigative detention must be based on reasonable suspicion having regard to the totality of the circumstances. We find that reasonable suspicion did not exist, and Cpl S’s actions were therefore not reasonable.

Finding #1:

The allegation that Cpl S improperly arrested or detained Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #1: “No identifiable action required.”

Recommendation #1:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM ensure military police and civilians conducting and evaluating CPIC queries, including Cpl S, be provided training or refresher training on proper procedures for CPIC usage, including verification procedures and index scoring. This may include but is not limited to CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex C “CPIC Query Procedures” and Annex E “CPIC Hit Confirmations,” as well as CPIC User Manual. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. All persons currently receive the noted training through the CPKN CPIC.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be partially accepted.

  The MPCC understands the CPKN to be the Canadian Police Knowledge Network^{Footnote 21}. While completion of this online training is a positive baseline for professional development, it is generic in nature and does not provide MP-specific instruction on the requirements of CF MP Gp Order 2-640, including the verification of identifiers, index scoring, and the operational risks of acting on unconfirmed CPIC hits, particularly in circumstances where misidentification can contribute to racial profiling or other discriminatory treatment. The CFPM also makes no comment on the MPCC’s recommendation for additional training specific to this incident, and the need for periodic refresher training was not addressed, leaving a gap in ensuring ongoing compliance with proper CPIC procedures.

  For this reason, the response cannot reasonably be interpreted as full acceptance of the recommendation.

59. CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex E entitled “CPIC Hit Confirmations” states, under the heading “Wait Times,” that “the Supreme Court of Canada has deemed that detention in excess of 20 minutes while awaiting a CPIC hit confirmation does not constitute a violation of a person’s Charter rights.” A blanket statement such as the above is not an accurate representation of police powers. Investigative detention will only be justified if an officer has reasonable suspicion, and only when considered with the totality of the circumstances. This includes the manner of detention.^{Footnote 22}

Recommendation #2:

The MPCC recommends that CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex E entitled “CPIC Hit Confirmations” regarding wait times be updated to better reflect the jurisprudence. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. MP policy/procedures to be reviewed and updated as applicable based on Canadian best policing practices.”

  The response provided by the CFPM is too vague to be considered fully accepted. The MPCC’s recommendation was specific and identified a particular MP Order to be amended. Ensuring that MP policies and procedures are consistent with Canadian best policing practices is already a baseline expectation of the CFPM. While the CFPM has stated that “action” will be taken, the response does not specify which military police policies and procedures will be reviewed and updated, nor how any update will address the specific concern raised in this case. It also lacks details about the specific steps that will be taken to fully implement the recommendation.

  The language used is non-committal; expressions such as “to be reviewed” and “as applicable” imply an intention to consider the issue rather than a concrete commitment to act.

  Moreover, the response does not demonstrate accountability, as it gives no indication of how and when the review will take place, nor of the standard that will guide its implementation. As such, it cannot reasonably be interpreted as full acceptance of the recommendation.

60. We note the PS observation that both Cpl S and Cpl B failed to obtain and store relevant evidence. Cpl B did not take photographs in accordance with the principles described in Military Police Qualification Level 5A and Military Police Investigator’s Course. Neither Cpl S nor Cpl B secured available CCTV footage of Mr. F’s detention and his interactions with MP members. The MPCC observes that this is a critical element of any detention, which justifies the use of video recording devices in patrol cars. The video retention policy at the base was only 30 days, and the recording was therefore unavailable for this complaint process.

Recommendation #3:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM ensure all military police members, and in particular Cpl S and Cpl B, be reminded of their duties of evidence preservation. (Accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. All MP members to be reminded as part of ongoing leadership/mentorship.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be accepted.

Recommendation #4:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM review policies and procedures related to the securing and retention of video recordings (e.g., CCTV) when detention or potential misconduct is alleged. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. MP Policy/procedures to be reviewed and updated as applicable based on Canadian best policing practices.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be partially accepted. Ensuring that MP policies/procedures are in accordance with Canadian best policing practices is a standard already expected of the CFPM. While the CFPM has stated that “action” will be taken, the response does not specify which military police policies and procedures will be reviewed and updated, nor whether the review will include the specific issues identified by the MPCC concerning the securing and retention of video evidence during or after a detention. There is no engagement with the MPCC’s specific recommendations with respect to evidence preservation in situations of detention or potential misconduct is alleged.

  The language used is non-committal; expressions such as “to be reviewed” and “as applicable” imply an intention to consider the issue rather than a concrete commitment to act.

  Moreover, the response does not demonstrate accountability, as it gives no indication of how and when the review will take place, nor of the standard that will guide its implementation. As such, it cannot reasonably be interpreted as full acceptance of the recommendation.

61. Cpl P told PS he assumed there was a debrief with Cpl S after the incident but did not remember what was said. Cpl S stated that he takes more time to confirm facts since the incident, but no management follow up appears to have been taken. PS observed that Cpl S, Cpl B, and Ms. T ought to “ensure appropriate use [and] wholesome understanding of CPIC ‘Index Scoring’ moving forward to assist in investigations” and “ensure due care in analysis of information received via CPIC.” Ms. T did not recall any emails or meetings with staff to prevent similar mistakes. It appears that no action was taken since we do not see any mention of follow up on this observation in the file.

62. This incident illustrates the operational risks that can arise from acting on unverified CPIC alerts without proper corroboration. It also raises a broader concern about the potential for disproportionate intrusions on liberty, particularly where individuals from racialized communities may be affected. While no systemic finding is made, the MPCC notes these risks for the purpose of institutional reflection and future training consideration.

63. The MPCC further notes a lack of meaningful supervisory engagement during or after Mr. F’s detention. There is no indication that the chain of command reviewed the decision to detain Mr. F based on an unconfirmed CPIC match, nor that guidance was provided once the error became apparent. Instead of providing corrective or de-escalatory leadership, Cpl P’s response, discussed further below, contributed to Mr. F’s sense of intimidation and frustration.

Recommendation #5:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM issue specific guidance to supervisors for response to police error or misconduct. This ought to include the need for immediate review of incidents of police error or misconduct, the specific role that supervisors play in de-escalation of such incidents with a professional and rights-conscious approach and debrief practices to prevent recurrence. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. This is standard practice as part of police leadership training. There is a process in place to address both performance and conduct deficiencies.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. Although the CFPM acknowledges the recommendation, the response does not address its substance. Specifically, the first part of the recommendation, that the CFPM “issue specific guidance to supervisors for response to police error or misconduct,” has not been addressed. Moreover, the assertion that this is already covered by “standard practice” is unresponsive to this complaint, in which no such actions were taken. Without any specific practices, materials, policies, or sources cited, the MPCC is unable to confirm whether the elements recommended are incorporated into existing leadership expectations.

Cpl S wrongly handcuffed Mr. F

64. Mr. F was handcuffed and walked into an interview room under police escort. He was then uncuffed but left in the room under guard by Cpl B. Mr. F told the MPCC that he was told to stare forwards, facing the wall. Mr. F’s evidence in his MPCC interview was that he was detained for half an hour but later amended this to around 10 minutes. By contrast, Cpl B estimated the detention to be 5 to 10 minutes. As mentioned above, we find that the detention lasted 11 minutes. We recognize that stressful experiences, such as detention, can affect an individual’s perception of time.

65. PS noted that Cpl S handcuffed Mr. F based on “cautions learned from the CPIC query.” As noted above, Cpl S’s evidence is that he only knew of the caution for violence on the CPIC hit and added the second flight risk caution to his report after the fact in justification. PS noted that the restraints were removed once Mr. F was in the interview room, because he was calm and compliant. PS concluded that Cpl S acted in good faith while in the lawful performance of his duties.

66. As we have stated above, good faith alone is not the standard against which investigative detentions are evaluated. In determining whether an investigative detention is justified, the Supreme Court has held that not only is reasonable suspicion required, but also that the manner of the detention is reasonably responsive to the circumstances – that the nature of the stop is no more intrusive of liberty interests than is reasonably necessary.^{Footnote 23}

67. In this case, we find that Cpl S’s actions were disproportionate to the situation at hand. Despite the caution of violence on the warrant, there was little danger to officer safety or to the public of verifying the warrant while Mr. F was visible on CCTV, having been searched before entering the base. Cpl B could have gone to observe Mr. F outside while further verification was done. If detention was to be undertaken, one officer could have detained Mr. F without physical restraint beside his car while verifications were made. Given that Mr. F was compliant and having found nothing of concern in the pat down search he conducted, Cpl S could have decided against handcuffing Mr. F and instead escorted him without restraints.

68. The use of handcuffs, particularly in front of Mr. F’s colleagues and without justification, elevated the personal indignity of the experience and added to the harm caused by the unlawful detention. Such disproportionate use of restraint undermines public confidence in the fairness and accountability of military policing.

69. What is more, a CPIC caution flag, such as a “V” code for potential violence, may require heightened vigilance, but it does not independently justify the use of mechanical restraints. In this case, the CPIC return was not verified, and Mr. F exhibited no behaviour indicating violence, flight, or resistance. The decision to apply restraints was not based on observed risk but on an unconfirmed database alert.

70. Less intrusive options existed to respond to any of the concerns that may have subjectively existed in Cpl S’s mind. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has set out how to evaluate whether the length of an investigative detention was justifiable. They considered factors such as the intrusiveness of detention and found taking a suspect to the police detachment to be at the more intrusive end of the spectrum, as opposed to asking questions at the point of initial detention.^{Footnote 24} The Court of Appeal also considered factors such as whether the police could effectively carry out the investigation without continuing the detention, whether a lack of police diligence impacted the detention, or the nature of the suspected criminal offence.^{Footnote 25} Though these factors were used to evaluate the duration of a detention, they are similarly relevant to the manner of a detention.

71. Handcuffing is not prohibited in investigative detentions, but it must be reasonably necessary for the police to fulfill their duty – it is a serious intrusion normally reserved for the person who has been arrested.^{Footnote 26} Indeed, CF MP Gp Order 2-309 Annex B: Use of Force – Restraint Application requires an officer to balance officer safety or public safety concerns with factors that include the circumstances and the behaviour of the subject.^{Footnote 27} It states that “when considering the application of mechanical restraints on a subject, MP [military police] shall evaluate the situation based on the totality of circumstances to determine if mechanical restraints are necessary. The application of mechanical restraints is not automatic and may be avoided if the incident is non-aggressive and there is no concern for officer or public safety.”^{Footnote 28}

72. In this case, the circumstances did not justify the manner of Mr. F’s detention – at each step, from handcuffing to placement into an interview room, less intrusive options existed. We find that Cpl S violated CF MP Gp Order 2-309 Annex B: Use of Force – Restraint Application when he failed to consider whether restraints were necessary. This is compounded by his comments that he sought to add the justification of flight risk to his report after the fact.

73. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Cpl S did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. F, and nor was the manner of the detention reasonably necessary in the circumstances. In fact, the way Mr. F was detained contains many elements typically reserved for arrest.

Finding #2:

The allegation that Cpl S wrongfully handcuffed Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #2: “No identifiable action required.”

Recommendation #6:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S be provided training on investigative detentions, including the requirement to consider less intrusive measures and the totality of the circumstances. This may include but is not limited to CF MP Gp Order 2-355 “Investigative Detention” and CF MP Gp Order 2-309 Annex B: Use of Force – Restraint Application. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. All MP members to be reminded as part of ongoing leadership/mentorship.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be partially accepted. The CFPM’s response lacks sufficient detail to confirm that all aspects of the recommendation have been addressed. The response does not specify what MP members will be reminded of, nor does it address the specific remedial training recommended for the subject member following the MPCC’s analysis. The recommendation was directed, in part, at ensuring that the subject member receive training tailored to the deficiencies identified in this case; a general reminder to all members does not meet that objective. As such, the response falls short of the intent of the recommendation.

74. CF MP Gp Order 2-355 “Investigative Detention” states that “the use of handcuffs and a pat-down search are legally permissible, indeed required, for MP member/public safety reasons ONLY.”^{Footnote 29} The use of the word “required” leads a reader to understand that any officer safety concern will require the use of handcuffs. However, the jurisprudence establishes that the justification for restraints must be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. Less intrusive measures should be considered when addressing lower-level safety concerns. Cautions for violence ought not automatically support use of force where the totality of the circumstances does not justify it.

Recommendation #7:

The MPCC recommends that CF MP Gp Order 2-355 entitled “Investigative Detention” be updated to better reflect the jurisprudence. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. MP policy/procedures to be reviewed and updated as applicable based on Canadian best policing practices.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be partially accepted. Ensuring that MP policies/procedures are in accordance with Canadian best policing practices is a standard already expected of the CFPM. While the CFPM has stated that “action” will be taken, the response does not specify which military police policies and procedures will be reviewed and updated. It also lacks details about the specific steps that will be taken to fully implement the recommendation.

  The language used is non-committal; expressions such as “to be reviewed” and “as applicable” imply an intention to consider the issue rather than a concrete commitment to act.

  Moreover, the response does not demonstrate accountability, as it provides no indication of how and when the review will take place, nor of the standard that will guide its implementation. As such, it cannot reasonably be interpreted as full acceptance of the recommendation.

Recommendation #8:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide updated and ongoing training to all military police members on investigative detention and use of force, with an emphasis on contextual analysis and proportionality. We note specifically that cautions in CPIC must be assessed in context and not treated as predetermined requirements. (Accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. To be added to annual refresher training and to CF MP Gp Order 3-361.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to have been accepted. The CFPM proposes to update CF MP Gp Order 3-361 “Use of Force Refresher Training.”

Mr. F was not read his rights to counsel

75. Mr. F made no allegation in this respect. However, in reviewing the evidence, we noted that Mr. F was not read his rights to retain and instruct counsel upon detention. Section 10(b) of the Charter provides that everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.

76. There is no question that Mr. F was detained within the meaning of the Charter. Both officers’ notes specifically state that Mr. F was placed in investigative detention. Indeed, Mr. F’s physical liberty was removed: he was handcuffed and escorted by police into an interview room.

77. Cpl S stated twice in his interview with the MPCC that the rights to counsel were not read. He explained that if the date of birth error had not been discovered, he would have proceeded to arrest and given the Charter right to counsel at that point.

The applicable law and policy

78. The Supreme Court confirmed that section 10(b) Charter rights are engaged if someone is subject to investigative detention in R. v. Suberu (2009):

[2] The specific issue raised in this case is whether the police duty to inform an individual of his or her s. 10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel is triggered at the outset of an investigative detention — a question left open in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22. It is our view that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The concerns regarding compelled self-incrimination and the interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as soon as a detention is effected. Therefore, from the moment an individual is detained, s. 10(b) is engaged and, as the words of the provision dictate, the police have the obligation to inform the detainee of his or her right to counsel “without delay”. The immediacy of this obligation is only subject to concerns for officer or public safety, or to reasonable limitations that are prescribed by law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

[3] However, as this Court held in Mann, not every interaction between the police and members of the public, even for investigative purposes, constitutes a detention within the meaning of the Charter. Section 9 of the Charter does not dictate that police abstain from interacting with members of the public until they have specific grounds to connect the individual to the commission of a crime. Likewise, not every police encounter, even with a suspect, will trigger an individual’s right to counsel under s. 10(b). As Iacobucci J. aptly observed, “[t]he person who is stopped will in all cases be ‘detained’ in the sense of ‘delayed’, or ‘kept waiting’. But the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint” (para. 19).^{Footnote 30}

79. A person may be detained physically or psychologically. The question in all such cases is when the interaction with police crystallizes into a detention.^{Footnote 31}

80. In this case, however, the detention was clear. It is documented in the officer’s notes. It involved handcuffing, police escort into an interview room, and supervision in that room once the handcuffs were removed. A brief pat-down search would not, on its own, justify delay in providing information about the right to counsel; after that point, the remainder of the eleven-minute detention required that Mr. F be advised of his right to counsel without delay.

81. What is more troubling is that the CF MP Gp Order that governs and instructs military police in this area appears to be legally incorrect. CF MP Gp Order 2-355 Investigative Detention specifically states that “it is not necessary to give cautions and Charter rights to the person unless an arrest is warranted and carried out.^{Footnote 32}” This CF MP Gp Order was issued on 25 July 2014 and remains in effect today. The only jurisprudence listed in the references is Mann, which as noted above, specifically left open the question later resolved in Suberu. The guidance is therefore inconsistent with binding Supreme Court authority. By contrast, CF MP Gp Order 2-360 on Arrest, Release and Pretrial Custody does provide that military police members “shall provide legal rights and appropriate cautions […] at the time of the arrest or detention,”^{Footnote 33} (emphasis added) – the guidance in both situations ought to be equivalent as required by binding caselaw.

82. The MPCC requested information from the Military Police Academy regarding training materials on investigative detention. We note with approval that not only is Mann cited, but also Suberu and its sister case Grant.^Footnote34 This said, nowhere do the materials mention the right to counsel, nor do the materials discuss the proportionality inherent in whether the manner of an investigative detention is reasonable.

83. Cpl S followed the applicable CF MP Gp Order, but the Order itself reflected outdated legal guidance and resulted in a breach of Mr. F’s Charter rights. There is therefore no finding of misconduct on the part of Cpl S in this regard. The MPCC finds it necessary, however, that the CFPM take immediate action to update the guidance and training given to military police on investigative detention and right to counsel. This is in addition to the recommendations we make above reflecting a need to conduct a systematic review of CF MP Gp Orders regarding investigative detention, wait times, and use of force.

Observation #1:

The MPCC observes that Cpl S breached Mr. F’s Charter rights when he failed to inform him of his right to retain and instruct counsel. We recognize that his conduct was in accordance with CF MP Gp Order 2-355 and therefore do not consider this misconduct. We do note, however, that all military police members ought to understand and comply with the requirements of the Charter.

Recommendation #9:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM undertake a complete and comprehensive review of the MP Orders applicable to investigative detention to ensure they reflect current jurisprudence. In particular, CF MP Gp Order 2-355 should be updated to ensure that the various forms of investigative detention are outlined, and guidance is provided when the right to retain and instruct counsel and to be informed of this right is required upon detention. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. MP policy/procedures to be reviewed and updated as applicable based on Canadian best policing practices.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be partially accepted. Ensuring that MP policies/procedures are in accordance with Canadian best policing practices is a standard already expected of the CFPM. While the CFPM has stated that “action” will be taken, the response does not specify which military police policies and procedures will be reviewed and updated, nor does it identify whether CF MP Gp Order 2-355, the Order specifically identified in the recommendation, will be amended to reflect binding Supreme Court jurisprudence. The response also lacks details about the steps that will be taken to implement the recommendation.

  The language used is non-committal; expressions such as “to be reviewed” and “as applicable” imply an intention to consider the issue rather than a concrete commitment to act.

  Moreover, the response does not demonstrate accountability, as it gives no indication of how and when the review will take place, nor of the standard that will guide its implementation. As such, it cannot reasonably be interpreted as full acceptance of the recommendation.

Recommendation #10:

The MPCC further recommends that while this review is ongoing, the CFPM issue an immediate communication with interim guidance on the issue. (Accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. CFPM communication to be sent.

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be accepted.

Recommendation #11:

In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. This information is already part of the MP formal training program.”

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken. CFPM communication to be sent.

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The MPCC obtained copies of current training materials at the MP Academy. The MPCC specifically noted above at para. 80 that training materials on investigative detention do not sufficiently cover Charter rights such as the s. 7 right to liberty, the s. 9 right against arbitrary detention, and s. 10(b) right to counsel. The CFPM, in asserting that this information is already part of the MP formal training program, does not refer to which training documents contain this information or how it is delivered. It would be inconsistent to accept that MP Orders require updating as per Recommendations 2, 7 and 9 but to decline to update training materials accordingly.

Cpl S racially profiled Mr. F

84. Mr. F argues that Cpl S “just played with me because of my color and background.” PS framed this allegation as whether or not Cpl S breached the MPPCC s. 4(d) because he acted in a discriminatory or discourteous manner. PS concluded, without interviewing Mr. F, that “there was no clear and convincing evidence that Cpl S was racially motivated when he placed Mr. F into investigative detention” and that he had acted “lawfully and in good faith.” In his request for review, Mr. F states that he suffered harassment and discrimination.

85. For the following reasons, we disagree with PS’s conclusion. We note that despite including some human rights case law in their research, PS did not apply the correct legal test in reaching its conclusions. We review the law applicable to racial profiling below before conducting our own analysis.

The applicable law

86. Discrimination laws typically focus on the impact of the behaviour rather than the intent behind it. Therefore, even actions taken in “good faith” can result in discrimination by racial profiling. It may occur even without overt prejudice or bad faith; what matters is the impact, and not an officer’s intentions.

87. Racial profiling occurs when race or racial stereotypes influence or motivate, consciously or unconsciously, decisions made by a person in authority regarding the selection or treatment of a suspect.^Footnote35 It may occur even without overt prejudice or bad faith; what matters is the impact, and not an officer’s intentions.

88. Even an interaction that would otherwise be lawful will be invalidated by racial profiling – the actions will be contaminated by improper thinking and there will be no reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds. ^Footnote36

89. The test for discrimination, including by racial profiling, requires three things to be established:

• a)  The complainant is a member of a group (or perceived as) that is characterized on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination;
• b)  While exercising a right protected by law, the complainant was subjected to differential or unusual treatment by a person in authority; and
• c)  A prohibited ground of discrimination was one of the factors that led the person in authority to apply the treatment in question.^Footnote37

90. It is also recognized that proving racial profiling is difficult. Police officers rarely admit to having acted in a discriminatory manner during an intervention. In cases where racial profiling is raised, we must therefore “evaluate all the circumstances and draw reasonable inferences from the overall picture revealed by the circumstantial evidence in light of official knowledge about racial profiling.” (our translation)^Footnote38

91. In this case, the first criterion is satisfied, as Mr. F is indeed a member of an ethnic group or race, and that Cpl S perceived him as racialized. Cpl S identified Mr. F’s ethnicity as “South Asian” in the General Occurrence File, and “from Middle Eastern” during his interview with PS.

92. The other two criteria of the test are harder to establish, as we very rarely find ourselves in the presence of direct evidence. Therefore, we must determine whether there has been differential treatment and whether race or colour has had an impact in the application of this differential treatment.^Footnote39 To do so, decision makers must look for factual indicators that can support the inference that the police conduct was racially motivated consciously or not, such as:

• Whether the police conduct took place in a context where experience has shown us that racial profiling manifests itself, including assessing behaviour for the exercising of investigative detentions, exercising arrests and search powers, or carding, street checks or routine traffic stops;
• Whether the police used a statutory or other investigative power as a pretext or ruse for a criminal investigation;
• Discrepancies or other irregularities in the officers’ notes or testimony;
• Pursuits, stops, arrests, detentions, etc. carried out without reasonable cause, or excessively under the circumstances;
• Intrusive questioning during a routine interception;
• Using racial terms or comments that communicate bias or prejudice;
• Deviations from normal practice; and
• Discourtesy or intransigence.^Footnote40

93. To determine differential treatment, the courts typically examine the evidence to assess whether the police officer’s actions deviated from standard practices in comparable situations. This means asking if the officer’s conduct aligned with typical procedures or whether there was a difference from the norm that suggests bias. Furthermore, the court considers whether the officer would have acted differently if the complainant had not been a member, or perceived to be a member, of a group that is characterized based on a prohibited ground of discrimination. ^Footnote41 For example, it is often useful to ask whether the officer would have acted in the same way towards a non-racialized person in the same circumstances.^Footnote42

94. Part of the circumstantial evidence that a court or tribunal can consider is the social context, including the fact that racial profiling by law enforcement in Canada is a recognized and documented phenomenon.^Footnote43 Although racial profiling had been previously addressed in Supreme Court jurisprudence, R. v. Le^Footnote44 was the first substantive decision specifically examining racial profiling in police interactions.^Footnote45 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously recognized the “disproportionate policing of racialized and low-income communities.”^Footnote46

95. For the following reasons, we find Mr. F was subject to differential or unusual treatment, and that his race was one of the factors that contributed to the treatment he received.

Mr. F was subject to differential treatment that constituted racial profiling

96. As concluded above, Mr. F was detained without reasonable cause. Cpl S did not adequately consider the facts known to him at the time or conduct reasonable due diligence. Proper confirmation of the CPIC hit was not done prior to acting on the warrant information.

97. Further, the manner of the detention was more restrictive than warranted in the circumstances – it was excessive.

98. We noted discrepancies in Cpl S’s evidence in that he and Cpl B both sought to cast suspicion on Mr. F and whether he would report the accident. This was not credible based upon the evidence at hand. Cpl S stated that he added justifications to the detention, namely a flight risk concern, after the fact, since he had not known this at the time of detention. “The absence of objective grounds for detention, or the fabrication of grounds, can lead to an inference that the detention was racially motivated.” ^Footnote47

99. To be clear, we do not conclude that it was unusual for military police to have investigated a motor vehicle accident that occurred on base, to ask for identification and insurance papers, or to run a CPIC query. It is what followed that departed from standard practice and contributed to differential treatment amounting to racial profiling.

A prohibited ground of discrimination contributed to Mr. F’s differential treatment

100. As we will now explain, there are a number of factors that lead us to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. F’s race is one of the reasons that he received differential or unusual treatment. Mr. F was racially profiled.

Cpl S made racial jokes about Mr. F

101. First, Cpl S made racial comments or jokes about Mr. F.

102. When filling out the report of the collision, Cpl S jokingly entered “Apu” as the name of the insurance company. This was a reference to a character from The Simpsons television show, known to be a caricature of a person of South Asian descent. Cpl B mentioned this in his interview with PS. The PS interviewer did not ask for any further details but simply stated that he was “tracking this incident” and was “aware that it had been facilitated.” Sgt C told PS that he was aware that Cpl S made a comment about Mr. F’s ethnicity after the incident and that the matter was dealt with by the chain of command. Cpl S was issued remedial measures as a result.

103. We find it troubling that PS did not investigate this further, especially since Mr. F alleged racial discrimination. Neither Cpl P nor Cpl S were asked any questions about the comment. In fact, Cpl P was specifically only asked whether Cpl S made any comments about Mr. F’s ethnicity before or during the incident. PS refused to provide disclosure of the disciplinary action, because it was not within the jurisdiction of Part IV of the National Defence Act. Paradoxically, PS did not analyze this as part of the complaint, seemingly because it was being dealt with by another process. The PS conclusion that Cpl S was not racially motivated when he detained Mr. F appears to refuse to consider this comment because it was made after the detention. This is a failure to see the forest from the trees. Even if the disciplinary process had taken place, this context was still directly relevant to the PS investigation as well. One action does not preclude the other.

104. In his MPCC interview, Cpl B stated that Cpl S tends to make a lot of jokes like this, but that normally he is more careful not to make them in front of the chain of command. He stated that both he and Sgt C heard this comment and indicated that it was inappropriate. When asked if there was a reason why nothing about this comment appeared in his notes, Cpl B stated only “not really.”

105. Cpl S told the MPCC that this comment had nothing to do with Mr. F, but that he had seen an “Apu” insurance company at another time. He stated that it was part of workplace culture to make such jokes, and that Cpl P also called Mr. F “Apu” some time after the accident. He claimed that disciplinary action was only initiated later, as retaliation for challenging Cpl P’s authority in a separate matter. While he maintained that there was no connection between Mr. F and the “Apu” comment, he understands now how it could be perceived that way.

106. We do not find it credible that there was no connection between Mr. F’s race and the comment about the character on The Simpsons. On a balance of probabilities, Cpl S would not have made this comment if Mr. F had not been a racialized person and who Cpl S had identified as being part of the same or similar race. Both Cpl B and Sgt C understood there to be this connection, as they offered this information in response to questions about whether Cpl S had made racial comments before, during, or after the incident with Mr. F.

107. We note here that in his MPCC interview, Mr. F added the allegation that Cpl S said something to the effect of “you guys are not Canadian” after Mr. F had been released. Cpl S denied this. Cpl B did not recall if Cpl S said this.

108. When Ms. T was asked if she remembered a comment about Mr. F not sounding or looking Canadian, she stated that there may have been a comment, but she could not remember if it was within earshot of Mr. F. She then said she believed it was a comment about Mr. F not being Canadian and that therefore he did not drive very well.

109. Ms. T also agreed that military police members at the detachment would make inappropriate jokes, sometimes with racial contents and that this was tolerated. She said she did not recall military police making jokes in front of someone of a different race, but they would do this in the confines of the detachment, amongst each other. She remembered Cpl S making jokes such as “he is from such and such a place, he is probably not a very good driver.” She recalled similar jokes from Cpl P. She felt that it was the dynamic of the group to make jokes like this.

110. On a balance of probabilities, we find that Cpl S made comments of a racial nature concerning Mr. F after the detention, including a reference to the character “Apu” and remarks questioning his Canadian status or linking his perceived origin to his driving ability. Ms. T, a disinterested witness, corroborated Cpl S’s statement that making inappropriate jokes, sometimes with racial content, was common at the detachment.

Additional CPIC queries were not documented

111. Second, CPIC queries were run on Mr. F’s co-workers. Mr. B told PS that Cpl S asked both him and Mr. S for their driver’s licences after Mr. F was detained. While Cpl S stated that he did not believe anyone else was queried in his MPCC interview, Cpl B corroborated Mr. B’s evidence. He told the MPCC that they were not initially asked for identification, but once military police believed Mr. F had an immigration warrant, they thought there was a possibility that the others did as well. Cpl B told MPCC that both Mr. B and Mr. S were run on CPIC. He did not remember who did this, but he believed it may have been Cpl S.

112. There is nothing documenting this search in either Cpl B or Cpl S’s notes. In fact, there is nothing in the officer’s notes regarding Mr. F’s concerns about racial profiling either. MPCC sought disclosure regarding what other CPIC queries were performed. The request was denied because there is no active investigation into misuse of the system.

113. The fact that these queries were run and not documented, considering the context of this case as well as the failure to secure CCTV footage of the interaction, lends further credence that there was a racial element to what happened that MP members did not document.

114. Neither Mr. S nor Mr. B have made complaints to the MPCC about this treatment, and therefore we have not made specific findings about it. This being said, it is part of the context surrounding Mr. F’s own detention and the manner in which it took place.

Additional CPIC queries were not documented

115. The courts have noted that inconsistent evidence about whether police noticed an individual’s race can be an indicator of racial profiling.^Footnote48

116. In their PS interviews, Sgt C, Capt P, and Cpl B all confirmed that Mr. F may have had a language barrier in communicating with military police, or that English was not his first language. We note that Mr. F speaks English well, but with a notable accent. In his PS interview, however, Cpl S did not recall an accent and did not believe that there was a language barrier.

117. In context, however, it is a further indicator of racialized assumptions and a reluctance by Cpl S to acknowledge characteristics that he otherwise associated with Mr. F. Taken together with other evidence, this supports an inference that race played a role in the differential treatment Mr. F received.

Mr. F was treated with discourtesy and intransigence

118. Finally, as we will discuss in more detail below, once he was released, Mr. F sought a copy of the arrest warrant. He expressed concerns about losing his security clearance or of having difficulty with his employment based upon the detention. While of course, military police could not show him CPIC results for another individual, Mr. F was not offered any means of confirming that he had a clear immigration or CPIC record. While he was given MPCC information, he was not offered an apology. Rather, as explained in more detail below, he suffered discourteous treatment from both Cpl S and Cpl P. They were rude and authoritative in the face of their own mistake. The courts have held that this, too, can be an indicator of racial profiling.

119. We have already concluded that Mr. F’s detention was not justified. Even if it had been, however, it would be invalidated by the existence of discrimination. An otherwise lawful detention or arrest is rendered arbitrary whenever police conduct is “tainted by any degree of racial profiling.”^Footnote49 We find that, on a balance of probabilities, Cpl S discriminated against Mr. F because racial profiling was at least part of the reasons for the treatment that Mr. F received.

120. This incident demonstrates how unconscious bias and poor verification practices can intersect to produce disproportionate policing outcomes for racialized individuals. While the finding in this case rests on individual conduct, the MPCC notes the institutional importance of continued bias-awareness training, CPIC validation protocols, and culturally competent practices in administrative policing contexts.

Finding #3:

The allegation that Cpl S engaged in racial profiling towards Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #3: “Finding not consistent with that of the Office of PS. No identifiable action required.”

  The CFPM’s response that “No identifiable action required” and that this finding is “not consistent with” the Office of PS in response to a substantiated allegation of racial profiling is at best inadequate.

  This response disregards both the seriousness of the misconduct and the need to prevent recurrence.

  Just as importantly, this response falls well short of contemporary standards of police leadership in Canada. When racial profiling is substantiated, the accepted expectation in modern policing is that leaders recognize the seriousness of the misconduct, acknowledge its impact on public trust, and articulate concrete steps to prevent recurrence, whether through supervision, training, policy review, or cultural reinforcement. These are foundational elements of ethical leadership and responsible policing.

  Racial profiling is not a minor lapse; it is a form of discrimination that contaminates police decision-making, undermines individual dignity, and erodes confidence in law enforcement. A substantiated finding of discriminatory policing therefore requires more than silence or disagreement. It demands institutional acknowledgment of the harm, reflection on contributing factors, and a clear commitment to ensuring that similar conduct does not recur. The response provided falls significantly short of these requirements and does not meet the standard expected of police leadership in Canada.

  Such a response risks diminishing confidence in the military police system’s ability to identify, address, and prevent discriminatory conduct, a core responsibility of any policing organization committed to fairness and public trust.

121. We note that Cpl S was already subject to a Unit Disciplinary Investigation about the “Apu” comment. Since disclosure was refused on this issue, we cannot comment on its sufficiency. Given the above evidence, we do not find previous actions to have adequately addressed the issue.

122. The entry of “Apu” in the MP report, while framed as a joke, reflects the use of a racial stereotype. Although it was recorded after the detention, it provides insight into Cpl S’s perception of Mr. F and reinforces the MPCC’s finding that race influenced the manner in which Mr. F was treated. This type of comment is relevant in understanding the broader context of the officer’s conduct and the presence of racial bias.

Recommendation #12:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S be provided training on strategies to combat racial profiling, including but not limited to unconscious bias and anti-racism. (Partially accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. Subject member received the noted training in 2024.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be only partially accepted. While it is positive that the subject member received some form of training in 2024, the CFPM has not provided any detail regarding its content, duration, or relevance. Without this information, the MPCC cannot assess whether the training responded to the specific areas identified in the recommendation, namely racial profiling, unconscious bias, and anti-racism. These are separate but interrelated concepts that require targeted instruction.

  Furthermore, training provided in 2024 does not substitute for training delivered after the benefit of the MPCC’s analysis of this incident. One of the purposes of remedial training is to ensure that the subject member reflects on the findings, understands how the misconduct occurred, and develops strategies to prevent recurrence. The CFPM’s response does not indicate that any such reflective or corrective component was provided. This is particularly notable given that the CFPM concluded that no identifiable action was required in response to the underlying finding.

123. PS observed that Cpl B’s notes were not consecutively numbered. The MPCC further notes that he did not include the additional CPIC queries of Mr. F’s co-workers in his notes, nor did he include information about the racial comment made by Cpl S. Cpl S did not include notes about the additional CPIC queries and gave evidence that he added justifications to Mr. F’s detentions after the fact. We have also noted, above, that Cpl B and Cpl S failed to secure the CCTV footage of their interactions with Mr. F.

Observation #2:

We observe that the MPs involved, specifically Cpl S and Cpl B, failed to take and maintain adequate notes in accordance with CF MP Gp Order 2-301.1. Key facts, such as the additional CPIC queries and a racially charged remark, were not recorded. Cpl S’s notes were also amended retroactively. These failures compromised the transparency and accountability of the record, particularly in the absence of preserved CCTV footage. This observation supports the recommendation that both members receive remedial training in note-taking practices.

Recommendation #13:

The MPCC recommends that both Cpl S and Cpl B be provided with training on their obligations with respect to note-taking procedures pursuant to CF MP Gp Order 2-301.1. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. MP members are regularly reminded of the noted requirements as part of ongoing leadership/mentoring”.

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The MPCC found that the subject member’s notes were significantly lacking in a manner that compromised the transparency and completeness of the record. The recommendation was for specific remedial follow-up informed by the MPCC’s findings and not a more general reminder existing obligations. A vague assurance of ongoing reminders does not address the identified deficiencies, nor does it demonstrate that the issues have been corrected.

124. The Military Police have no orders or policies on racial profiling. The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of racial profiling in Canada;^Footnote50 given the diverse populations and communities that military police interact with, both domestically and internationally, the need for clear guidelines is essential to prevent bias and ensure fair treatment.

Recommendation #14:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM adopt either MP Orders or policy instruments to aid MP members in preventing racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory treatment. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. This information is already part of the MP formal training program. All MPs also complete CPKN on this issue.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The recommendation concerned the adoption of MP-specific Orders or policy to support members in preventing racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory treatment. Training, while welcome, is a complement to clear policy direction, not a substitute for it. Without an MP-specific Order or directive, members lack authoritative guidance tailored to their operational context.

  In contemporary Canadian policing, written bias-free or anti-racial-profiling policies are recognized as essential components of professional practice. Police services across the country have adopted explicit policies that define and prohibit racial profiling, articulate expectations for officer conduct, and link training, supervision, and accountability mechanisms to those standards. These written policies provide clear, consistent, and enforceable direction to members and are a critical safeguard to ensure the fair and Charter-compliant exercise of police powers.

  By contrast, general online modules, such as CPKN anti-racism or unconscious-bias courses, are generic, self-paced workplace learning tools. They do not provide the detailed, policing-specific instruction required to guide the exercise of discretionary powers such as investigative detention or CPIC queries in a manner that prevents discriminatory practices. CPKN training is widely understood across Canadian policing as supplementary education; it is not considered sufficient as a standalone method of preparing officers to identify, understand, or avoid racial profiling in operational decision-making.

  The absence of MP-specific policy direction on racial profiling also presents a broader institutional risk. As the senior MP authority, the CFPM has an obligation to ensure that members operate under clear and principled standards in areas that directly affect individual rights and the fair exercise of police powers. Issues involving the potential for discriminatory policing require explicit, command-level guidance. Without such direction, members must navigate complex legal and ethical obligations without consistent reference points, increasing the risk of divergent practices and unequal treatment.

  Contemporary Canadian policing standards and Canada’s human rights commitments clearly expect police services to implement explicit guidance, accountability mechanisms, and safeguards to prevent discriminatory policing. The absence of MP-specific policy direction leaves Charter risks unmanaged and falls below the governance standards expected of a modern police organization.

  Standalone e-learning cannot fill the gap left by the absence of clear, enforceable MP Orders or directives. Reliance on generic training alone leaves a significant gap between contemporary policing standards and the guidance available to MP members. Without written, MP-specific policy direction there remains a heightened risk of inconsistent practices, unintentional bias, and recurrence of discrimination.

Recommendation #15:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide regular, ongoing training on cultural competency, unconscious bias and anti-racism to all MPs. (Accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. This is included as part of mandatory annual training.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation to be accepted. However, the response provides limited detail. The CFPM states that these topics are included as part of mandatory annual training, but does not describe the substance, scope, or frequency of this training. The MPCC notes that cultural competency, unconscious bias, and anti-racism are distinct concepts, and that meaningful training on these topics in a policing context must address operational realities, including the risk of racial profiling in the exercise of police powers.

  Without further information, the MPCC is unable to assess whether the training referred to in the Notice of Action fully meets the intent of the recommendation or adequately reflects best practices in contemporary Canadian policing. Nonetheless, based on the CFPM’s assertion that such training is already provided, the recommendation is marked as accepted.

125. In reviewing PS’s treatment of this file, we noted a few important failings that bear comment.

126. First, where racial profiling is alleged, the MPCC considers it particularly problematic not to interview the complainant and hear their experiences. An investigation into this type of misconduct requires nuanced consideration of all evidence available.

127. Second, despite researching and including discrimination case law in its assessment, PS never conducted a discrimination analysis. Rather, the investigator applied a standard of “good faith.” This is not the applicable legal framework, and in fact many actions taken in good faith may still amount to racial profiling.

128. Third, specifically excluding consideration of the racial comment known to have been made by the subject of the discrimination allegation is inappropriate and incorrect. This omission is directly at odds with the PS investigator’s conclusion that there was “no clear and convincing evidence” that Cpl S was racially motivated.

129. Finally, Mr. F was never offered an apology. He states in his request for review that he would like a formal written apology. After receiving PS’s decision on his complaint, Mr. F specifically requested an apology – he was told that the file indicated that he had already received one. In the MPCC’s review of the file, we find no documentation that Mr. F received an apology. In fact, Cpl S said in his MPCC interview that he had not apologized and acknowledged that perhaps he ought to have.

Recommendation #16:

The MPCC recommends as best practice that the CFPM interview complainants as well as subjects and witnesses in their investigations. This is particularly so where a complaint involves an allegation of discrimination and/or racial profiling. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “No identifiable action required. The CFPM does not normally conduct Professional Standards investigations. The Office of Professional Standards as well as MP investigators conduct interviews as required.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. Sections 250.26 and 250.28 of the National Defence Act place the duty to deal with and investigate conduct complaints squarely on the CFPM. While investigative tasks may be delegated to Professional Standards (PS), the statutory responsibility to ensure that investigations are conducted thoroughly, fairly, and to an appropriate standard remains with the CFPM. Delegation does not diminish this obligation.

  Despite the nature of the allegation in this case, the Complainant was not interviewed. This is not common practice in PS investigations; in practice, complainants are rarely interviewed. The CFPM’s response does not address this concern or provide any rationale for omitting this essential investigative step.

  The failure to interview the Complainant in a racial profiling investigation represents a significant departure from contemporary policing standards in Canada. Across federal, provincial, and municipal police services, interviewing the Complainant is recognized as a foundational investigative requirement, especially in discrimination cases where the individual’s account and lived experience are essential evidence. Proceeding without hearing directly from the Complainant, while relying primarily on officer notes and an assessment of “good faith,” undermines the completeness, fairness, and credibility of the investigation.

  Such an approach risks overlooking critical contextual information and does not meet the level of diligence expected in the investigation of allegations involving unequal treatment or discriminatory policing. Ensuring that a complainant’s experience is directly heard and meaningfully considered is vital to avoiding investigative blind spots and to maintaining confidence in the integrity of the complaint process.

  While interviewing complainants is always best practice, it is indispensable in matters alleging racial profiling, where understanding the complainant’s perspective is essential to assessing the full context of the interaction and the potential presence of discriminatory conduct.

Recommendation #17:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide PS investigators with training on the investigation and evaluation of complaints of racial profiling and discrimination. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action already taken. Professional Standards investigators already receive training on the noted topic.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The CFPM’s response provides no description of what training PS investigators receive, whether it addresses the specific competencies required to investigate racial-profiling complaints, or whether it is standardized, current, or evaluated for effectiveness. Without this detail, the MPCC cannot assess whether the training meaningfully responds to the concerns identified in this case.

  Moreover, the record of this file demonstrates that whatever training PS investigators currently receive is not sufficient. The PS investigation applied an incorrect legal test by assessing “good faith” rather than conducting a discrimination analysis. It failed to consider a known racial comment by the subject member, despite its clear relevance under established jurisprudential indicators of discriminatory treatment. PS also did not interview the Complainant, an essential investigative step in any allegation of racial profiling. These investigative errors reveal a significant gap in both legal understanding and investigative methodology.

  Contemporary Canadian policing standards recognize that the investigation of racial-profiling complaints requires specialized training. Investigators must understand how discriminatory conduct can manifest, how circumstantial evidence must be assessed, how deviations from standard practice may signal differential treatment, and how to apply the legal framework established in cases such as R. v. Le and R. v. Grant. They must also be equipped to conduct complainant interviews in a manner that captures the full context of the individual’s experience. The investigative shortcomings in this matter indicate that these expectations are not currently being met within PS.

  A general assertion that training exists, without any explanation of its content, scope, or relevance, does not provide assurance that PS investigators are adequately prepared to meet these obligations. Nor does it reflect the level of transparency or accountability expected when responding to demonstrated investigative deficiencies in a discrimination complaint. In a modern police organization, a substantiated concern about the handling of racial-profiling complaints should prompt a transparent account of the training in place, an explanation of how it equips investigators to meet their obligations, and clear steps to strengthen it where gaps are identified. A bare assertion that training exists does not satisfy contemporary standards of police accountability and does not provide confidence that discriminatory-policing complaints will be investigated to the standard required.

  In the circumstances, and given the investigative shortcomings evidenced in this file, the MPCC cannot reasonably interpret the CFPM’s response as full acceptance of this recommendation.

Recommendation #18:

Mr. F was handcuffed and put into an interview room under military police escort in error and based at least in part on discrimination. While the MPCC notes that military police sought to explain the error to Mr. F, there is no evidence that military police took significant action to meet Mr. F’s concerns or to offer an apology. The MPCC recommends that the CFPM issue a formal apology. (Accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action to be taken.”

  The MPCC considers this recommendation as being accepted. The MPCC applauds the CFPM’s commitment to provide a formal apology and requests to be copied on this action within 30 days of this report.

Cpl S and Cpl P were correct not to show Mr. F the Immigration warrant

130. After he was released, Mr. F and at least one of his co-workers requested to see a copy of the warrant that had caused Mr. F to be detained. Mr. F argues that both Cpl S and Cpl P were wrong to refuse to show it to him. PS concluded that Cpl S and Cpl P were justified in refusing to share the arrest warrant and CPIC query information, because Mr. F was not authorized to see this protected information. In his request for review, Mr. F argues that by refusing to show him the immigration warrant, Cpl S and Cpl P did not prove the grounds for his detention.

131. Cpl S and Cpl P were correct to refuse to share a CPIC result that was for someone other than Mr. F.

132. CF MP Gp Order 2-640 confirms that CPIC information is considered Protected B – it shall not be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. Information that the government has about individuals is protected so that their privacy is respected. Information about one person cannot be given to someone else unless they are authorized to have it. This means that military police could not show it to Mr. F – once they realized that the warrant was about someone else, they could not show it to him or give him a copy.

133. The information contained in CPIC returns includes third-party law enforcement alerts, immigration records, and caution codes that are protected under federal privacy laws. Disclosure to a civilian, even the subject of a mistaken match, may breach these protections and compromise interagency information-sharing protocols.

134. We note, however, that no other assistance was offered. Cpl B told the MPCC that Mr. F seemed worried about his employment. Cpl P told PS that Mr. F expressed concern about the CPIC hit and wanted to know how to ensure this would not happen again. He believed Mr. F was referred to the MPCC. Mr. F confirmed that he was referred to another government department. Beyond this, Mr. F was not offered any other assistance. MP members could have offered to call Mr. F’s employer and confirm that the detention had been a mistake. They could have provided him a letter indicating that he had a clear CPIC record. They could have provided information about how he could apply for an official police check or his immigration records.

135. Indeed, as noted, Mr. F was not even offered an apology.

136. We therefore find that Cpl S and Cpl P were correct not to disclose any information from CPIC – they were not permitted to show Mr. F a warrant about someone else. That said, we observe that there were other ways to help resolve Mr. F’s concerns that were appropriate given the error that had been made.

Finding #4:

The allegation that Cpl S and Cpl P wrongly refused to show Mr. F the immigration warrant that led to his detention is not supported by the evidence.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #4: “Finding consistent with that of the Office of PS. No identifiable action required.”

  The MPCC notes the CFPM’s agreement with the finding that MP members were correct not to disclose CPIC information to Mr. F. This finding turns solely on the legal and policy restrictions governing Protected B information. As such, the MPCC agrees that no further action is required in response to this specific issue.

Though they did not threaten him with force, both Cpl S and Cpl P intimidated Mr. F

137. Allegations #5 and #6 concern the same post-detention interaction, so we will discuss them together. Mr. F argues that, in the conversation where he requested to see the warrant, Cpl S intimidated him and threatened to arrest him. He argues that Cpl P intimidated him and threatened to use force against him. For the following reasons, we find that these allegations are partially supported by the evidence.

138. Military police do have authority to control access to military bases, but this authority must be exercised for lawful and legitimate purposes, not in a manner that could reasonably be perceived as punitive or retaliatory after a mistaken detention has been resolved.

139. With respect to Cpl S, PS framed these allegations as potential breaches of the MPPCC s. 4(l): “engage in conduct that is likely to discredit the military police or that calls into question the member’s ability to carry out their duties in a faithful and impartial manner”.^Footnote51 With respect to Cpl P, PS considered whether there was a breach of 4(l), as well as 4(d).” ^Footnote52

There is insufficient evidence to conclude Mr. F was threatened with arrest or with force

140. For the following reasons, we find that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. F was threatened with arrest or the use of force.

141. PS concluded that Cpl S did not threaten Mr. F with force. PS also concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, Cpl P did not threaten Mr. F with the use of force, but “may have demonstrated an authoritative tone.” We note, however, that these conclusions were made without interviewing Mr. F.

142. The evidence on this point is mixed. At the time of his MPCC interview, Mr. F’s evidence was that both Cpl P and Cpl S used the word “force” in speaking to him. He said that MP members threatened him and his co-workers to leave, and he felt that they could beat him, shoot him, or lock him up – they could do anything, because they had power and he had none, and “when somebody have power they can do whatever they want.” He felt that their body language was aggressive, “like they are ready to jump on someone.”

143. Cpl S told PS that use of force is a term of art that may have been used to explain the detention itself, but Cpl P did not remember using it. In their PS interviews, Cpl B and Sgt C did not recall any such threats, and Mr. B did not mention this in his correspondence with PS. Cpl B told PS that while Cpl S did not threaten to detain Mr. F, Cpl S did say he was not bound to provide Mr. F with a copy of the warrant. In his MPCC interview, Cpl B stated that he did not recall Cpl S making threats to arrest or detain Mr. F, but that it was possible.

144. We find it notable that Mr. B did not corroborate Mr. F’s evidence on this point, as a witness and participant in the conversation. Beyond Mr. F’s evidence, there is only Cpl B’s evidence that it was possible Cpl S made these threats.

145. We find that there is simply not enough evidence to find that Mr. F was threatened, verbally, with force or arrest on a balance of probabilities.

There is insufficient evidence to conclude Mr. F was threatened with arrest or with force

146. There is, however, enough evidence to find that both Cpl S and Cpl P intimidated Mr. F. They were rude, violating their duty not to act in a discourteous manner towards any person.

147. PS concluded that Cpl S was not aggressive or discourteous in his interactions with Mr. F. PS noted that Cpl P may have had an “elevated level of frustration during the repeated attempts to explain” the errors that led to Mr. F’s detention, but that there was no clear and convincing evidence to suggest that Cpl P threatened Mr. F or used inappropriate language.

148. We note that using inappropriate language is not the only marker of discourteous conduct. Both Cpl S and Capt P described the interaction as “heated” in their interviews with PS. In his MPCC interview, Mr. F described both Cpl S and Cpl P’s body language as aggressive.

149. With respect to Cpl S, Cpl P described him to PS as calm, professional and articulate in dealing with Mr. F. Mr. B described him as “flat and interrogative.” Cpl B told PS that Cpl S was courteous, but that he generally has a harsh tone and talks down to people. In his MPCC interview, Cpl B’s evidence changed. He stated that though Cpl S was calm in talking to Mr. F, his demeanour was somewhat discourteous. He did not feel that Cpl S was different in dealing with Caucasian people than non-Caucasians, though they did not see many people of colour on the base. Master Corporal (MCpl) L said that Cpl S is a rule breaker, a boundary pusher who talks down to people and is always looking for something bigger than what is there. Sgt C described Cpl S to PS as stern, but that this was not unique to the interaction with Mr. F. Ms. T told the MPCC the same thing – Cpl S was a “typical police officer” and “could be abrupt,” but that he was caring towards his co-workers.

150. We have considered this evidence in context, considering the racial jokes Cpl S made, the lack of apology, and the totality of the circumstances. We find that Cpl S was discourteous in his dealings with Mr. F on a balance of probabilities, including adopting an intimidating manner. We find that Cpl S breached MPPCC s. 4(d) by acting in a discourteous manner.

151. With respect to Cpl P, Mr. F’s evidence was that Cpl P also had aggressive body language, and that he was biased and not willing to hear him. Mr. B’s evidence was not only, as PS said, that the conversation with Cpl P showed a level of frustration, but also that the interaction was “full of arguments.”

152. Military police evidence on this point was mixed. Cpl S told PS that Cpl P’s demeanour could have been more professional and that his tone could be seen as discourteous – he could have calmed down more. He stated that Cpl P used an authoritative tone that could be seen as arrogant, “like flexing, I’m in charge here.” In his MPCC interview, however, he stated that there was nothing wrong with Cpl P’s tone, that it was not aggressive or threatening, but that Cpl P generally lacks professionalism. Cpl B’s consistent evidence was that Cpl P was courteous throughout the conversation. MCpl L found him generally courteous though he did not observe the conversation with Mr. F. Sgt C stated that both Cpl S and Cpl P seemed frustrated, though he was not close to the conversation and believed that they were professional and courteous despite the frustration.

153. Ms. T did not witness the conversation between Mr. F and Cpl P. When asked if she had heard anything about threats or use of the word force, she stated that she did not recall but that, from her memory of Cpl P, she would not put it past him to be forceful in his demeanour. In her own interactions with Cpl P, she did not find him threatening, but she did find him forceful.

154. Cpl P described his own tone as calm and stated he never had to elevate it. He stated that the tone of the conversation was less heated after he became involved. At the end of his interview with PS, however, Cpl P was read the allegations. He called Mr. F “vindictive” and stated “wow. Nicely done by Mr. [F], I’m impressed.”

155. There is enough evidence to conclude that Cpl P was also discourteous towards Mr. F and used an intimidating manner. Both Mr. F and Mr. B experienced the interaction to be combative. Cpl S, though his evidence was changeable, indicated that Cpl P was arrogant. Cpl P made no apology or offer of assistance to reassure Mr. F after his staff wrongfully detained him. Cpl P is also heard making mocking comments at the end of his PS interview. Taking a holistic view of the evidence, we find on a balance of probabilities that Cpl P was discourteous, in breach of MPPCC 4(d).

156. While the allegation is only partially supported, the interaction illustrates the importance of clear, respectful, and transparent communication, particularly following a police error. Even when conduct falls short of misconduct, the tone and manner of release can significantly shape a complainant’s perception of fairness and accountability.

Finding #5:

The allegation that Cpl S intimidated or threatened to arrest Mr. F is partially supported by the evidence in that he was discourteous.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #5: “Finding consistent with that of the Office of PS. No identifiable action required.”

  The MPCC does not consider the CFPM’s response to reflect an accurate understanding of the MPCC’s finding. The Notice of Action states that the finding is “consistent with that of the Office of PS,” yet PS concluded, without interviewing the Complainant, that “on a balance of probabilities, it was determined Cpl [S] was not aggressive or discourteous.” This directly contradicts the MPCC’s conclusion that Cpl S was discourteous and intimidating on a balance of probabilities.

  Accordingly, the MPCC does not consider the CFPM’s response to constitute acceptance or accurate acknowledgement of the finding.

Finding #6:

The allegation that Cpl P intimidated or threatened to use force against Mr. F is partially supported by the evidence in that he was discourteous.

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following about Finding #6: “Finding not consistent with that of the Office of PS. No identifiable action required.”

Recommendation #19:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S and Cpl P be provided training in de-escalation measures and conflict management skills. (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action already taken. All MP members receive the noted training on an annual basis.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The MPCC recommended specific, remedial follow-up with the subject members with the benefit of its findings.

157. Finally, we note that Cpl P made no notes of his interactions with Mr. F on February 23, 2021. CF MP Gp Order 2-301 entitled “Police Notes” requires that all members engaged in policing functions maintain a police notebook “to reflect their involvement and activities related to all police matters and investigations.”^{Footnote 53} Cpl P spoke to the subject of a mistaken detention and engaged in a heated conversation. This ought to have been reflected in his notes.

Recommendation #20:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl P be required to review CF MP Gp Order 2-301 entitled “Police Notes.” (Not accepted by the CFPM)

• In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated the following: “Action already taken. MP members are regularly reminded of the noted requirements as part of ongoing leadership/mentorship.”

  The MPCC does not consider this recommendation to be accepted. The subject member made no notes at all of a heated interaction that followed a wrongful detention, an event that clearly fell within the scope of CF MP Gp Order 2-301. A generalized reminder to all MP members does not address this specific deficiency nor demonstrate that the individual member understands and will comply with his obligations going forward.

  The recommendation sought individual, remedial review of the Order by the subject member; the response does not confirm that such review occurred.

158. After reviewing all information and documents relevant to this complaint, we prepared the Interim Report in accordance with section 250.32(3) of the NDA. The Interim Report was issued on July 29, 2025, and transmitted to the CFPM, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence.

Cpl S wrongly handcuffed Mr. F

159. In accordance with section 250.51 of the NDA, the CFPM is required to notify the Minister of National Defence and the MPCC Chairperson of any action that has been or will be taken in response to the MPCC’s Interim Report. On October 28, 2025, the MPCC received the CFPM’s Notice of Action dated October 27, 2025.

160. In the Notice of Action, the CFPM stated that “no identifiable action was required” in response to the MPCC’s findings. With respect to four findings in particular, the CFPM noted that two were consistent with those of the Office of PS and two were not. As discussed above, it was incorrect to claim that the MPCC’s finding on discourteous treatment was consistent with PS; PS reached the opposite conclusion. Only MPCC Finding #4 is consistent with PS. Accuracy in distinguishing these assessments is essential, particularly in a case involving wrongful detention and concerns about discriminatory treatment.

161. The findings and recommendations in this report address not only the conduct of the individual members involved, but also the broader responsibility to guard against the well-recognized risk of racial profiling inherent in policing. Preventing recurrence requires clear policy direction, rigorous training, effective supervision, and a demonstrable commitment to learning from error. Several responses in the Notice of Action did not meaningfully engage with the substance of the MPCC’s recommendations or indicate how the underlying issues would be addressed. This raises concerns about the organization’s commitment to meaningful reform.

162. In Canadian policing, most major police services have adopted explicit bias-free or anti-racial-profiling policies supported by specialized training, race-based data initiatives, supervisory expectations, and public accountability mechanisms. These frameworks reflect an established and evolving expectation that police organizations implement clear written policies, provide specific guidance to prevent discriminatory practices, and demonstrate transparently how corrective action will be taken when concerns arise. The Military Police currently lacks MP-specific policy instruments of this kind, and the CFPM’s Notice of Action did not identify steps to close this gap. This divergence from modern policing practice heightens the risk that similar incidents will recur and that concerns about discriminatory treatment will remain insufficiently addressed.

163. As the senior MP authority, the CFPM plays a central leadership role in ensuring that lessons identified through oversight translate into concrete institutional improvements. Effective leadership requires clear articulation of corrective steps, timely action, and transparent communication. The limited detail in several responses falls short of these leadership responsibilities and risks weakening confidence in the MP oversight framework, particularly in matters involving wrongful detention or allegations of discriminatory treatment, including racial profiling.

164. Accordingly, the MPCC considers only five of the recommendations to have been accepted in their entirety. The remaining recommendations were either rejected outright or accompanied by responses too vague to demonstrate that the issues identified will be resolved. In a case involving errors in detention, discourteous and intimidating conduct, and discriminatory treatment, a higher degree of specificity, reflection, and institutional accountability is required.

165. The CFPM’s limited and non-specific responses fall short of the leadership standards expected of a modern Canadian police organization. Effective oversight relies on substantive engagement with findings, transparent articulation of corrective steps, and clear institutional learning. When leadership does not fully address identified deficiencies, the statutory oversight framework established by Parliament is weakened, and opportunities to strengthen military policing culture are lost. Members of the military police, the Canadian Forces, and the public they serve are entitled to a policing service that demonstrates accountability, professionalism, and a commitment to continuous improvement.

166. True accountability requires more than a conclusion that “no identifiable action” is necessary. It requires clear and concrete explanations of how errors will be corrected, how risk will be mitigated, and how similar incidents will be prevented. The MPCC urges the CFPM to fully implement the recommendations in this report to reinforce the professionalism, fairness, and rigour expected of the military police and that members of the Canadian Forces deserve.

Summary of the Findings, Recommendations and Observations

Finding #1:

The allegation that Cpl S improperly arrested or detained Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

Finding #2:

The allegation that Cpl S wrongfully handcuffed Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

Finding #3:

The allegation that Cpl S engaged in racial profiling towards Mr. F is supported by the evidence.

Finding #4:

The allegation that Cpl S and Cpl P wrongly refused to show Mr. F the immigration warrant that led to his detention is not supported by the evidence.

Finding #5:

The allegation that Cpl S intimidated or threatened to arrest Mr. F is partially supported by the evidence in that he was discourteous.

Finding #6:

The allegation that Cpl P intimidated or threatened to use force against Mr. F is partially supported by the evidence in that he was discourteous.

Recommendation #1:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM ensure military police and civilians conducting and evaluating CPIC queries, including Cpl S, be provided training or refresher training on proper procedures for CPIC usage, including verification procedures and index scoring. This may include but is not limited to CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex C “CPIC Query Procedures” and Annex E “CPIC Hit Confirmations,” as well as CPIC User Manual. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #2:

The MPCC recommends that CF MP Gp Order 2-640 Annex E entitled “CPIC Hit Confirmations” regarding wait times be updated to better reflect the jurisprudence. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #3:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM ensure all military police members, and in particular Cpl S and Cpl B, be reminded of their duties of evidence preservation. (Accepted)

Recommendation #4:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM review policies and procedures related to the securing and retention of video recordings (e.g., CCTV) when detention or potential misconduct is alleged. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #5:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM issue specific guidance to supervisors for response to police error or misconduct. This ought to include the need for immediate review of incidents of police error or misconduct, the specific role that supervisors play in de-escalation of such incidents with a professional and rights-conscious approach and debrief practices to prevent recurrence. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #6:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S be provided training on investigative detentions, including the requirement to consider less intrusive measures and the totality of the circumstances. This may include but is not limited to CF MP Gp Order 2-355 “Investigative Detention” and CF MP Gp Order 2-309 Annex B: Use of Force – Restraint Application. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #7:

The MPCC recommends that CF MP Gp Order 2-355 entitled “Investigative Detention” be updated to better reflect the jurisprudence. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #8:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide updated and ongoing training to all military police members on investigative detention and use of force, with an emphasis on contextual analysis and proportionality. We note specifically that cautions in CPIC must be assessed in context and not treated as predetermined requirements. (Accepted)

Recommendation #9:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM undertake a complete and comprehensive review of the MP Orders applicable to investigative detention to ensure they reflect current jurisprudence. In particular, CF MP Gp Order 2-355 should be updated to ensure that the various forms of investigative detention are outlined, and guidance is provided when the right to retain and instruct counsel and to be informed of this right is required upon detention. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #10:

The MPCC further recommends that while this review is ongoing, the CFPM issue an immediate communication with interim guidance on the issue. (Accepted)

Recommendation #11:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM update training programs at the Military Police Academy to ensure that the Charter and its application to investigative detention are properly covered. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #12:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S be provided training on strategies to combat racial profiling, including but not limited to unconscious bias and anti-racism. (Partially Accepted)

Recommendation #13:

The MPCC recommends that both Cpl S and Cpl B be provided with training on their obligations with respect to note-taking procedures pursuant to CF MP Gp Order 2-301.1. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #14:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM adopt either MP Orders or policy instruments to aid military police members in preventing racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory treatment. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #15:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide regular, ongoing training on cultural competency, unconscious bias and anti-racism to all MPs. (Accepted)

Recommendation #16:

The MPCC recommends as best practice that the CFPM interview complainants as well as subjects and witnesses in their investigations. This is particularly so where a complaint involves an allegation of discrimination and/or racial profiling. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #17:

The MPCC recommends that the CFPM provide PS investigators with training on the investigation and evaluation of complaints of racial profiling and discrimination. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #18:

Mr. F was handcuffed and put into an interview room under military police escort in error and based at least in part on discrimination. While the MPCC notes that military police sought to explain the error to Mr. F, there is no evidence that military police took significant action to meet Mr. F’s concerns or to offer an apology. The MPCC recommends that the CFPM issue a formal apology. (Accepted)

Recommendation #19:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl S and Cpl P be provided training in de-escalation measures and conflict management skills. (Not Accepted)

Recommendation #20:

The MPCC recommends that Cpl P be required to review CF MP Gp Order 2-301 entitled “Police Notes.” (Not Accepted)

Observation #1:

The MPCC observes that Cpl S breached Mr. F’s Charter rights when he failed to inform him of his right to retain and instruct counsel. We recognize that his conduct was in accordance with CF MP Gp Order 2-355 and therefore do not consider this misconduct. We do note, however, that all military police members ought to understand and comply with the requirements of the Charter.

Observation #2:

We observe that the MPs involved, specifically Cpl S and Cpl B, failed to take and maintain adequate notes in accordance with CF MP Gp Order 2-301.1. Key facts, such as the additional CPIC queries and a racially charged remark, were not recorded. Cpl S’s notes were also amended retroactively. These failures compromised the transparency and accountability of the record, particularly in the absence of preserved CCTV footage. This observation supports the recommendation that both members receive remedial training in note-taking practices.

Ottawa, December 9, 2025